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IDENTITY OF PARTIES

Appellants:

Jennifer Chapman (Minor)

Teresa Chapman
Robert Chapman
Respondents:

SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC., a Utah corporation;

THE HOME GROUP, INC., a foreign corporation.

OTHER PARTY DEFENDANTS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS APPEAL1
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a hospital organized to do
business in the State of Utah;
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a hospital organized
to do business in the State of Utah;
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation dba PRIMARY
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL;
THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS. By order entered April 1,
1986, The District court redesigned the name of all of
the above Other Party Defendants as "I.H.C. Hospitals,
Inc., a Utah Corporation dba Primary Children's Medical
Center" (R.283).
GARTH MEYERS, M.D. ;
L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D., KAREN BOWMAN, R.N.
JOHN DOE I-X; and
BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V.

1

Appeal No. 860230 from the summary judgment granted as to
Plaintiffs' claim, in favor of defendants, Primary Children's
Hospital, Primary Children's Medical Center, Intermountain Health
Care, IHC Hospitals, Inc., and The Health Services of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is presently pending in the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. Appeal No 860230 involves
many of the same issues presented by this appeal.
-iii-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Trial Court was correct in its holding that, as a
matter of law, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. committed no
intentional torts against Plaintiffs.

II.

Whether The Home Group Inc.'s ownership of Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc. in and of itself is a sufficient basis for a
claim for damages against The Home Group, Inc.

III.

Whether the Trial Court correctly held that plaintiffs'
medical negligence claims arising in 1973 are barred by the
statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing their Complaint
on October 8, 1985.
Jennifer Chapman.
sections.

Their Complaint arises out of the injuries of
It is organized in seven Roman numeraled

The first section, numbered I, simply identifies the

parties and sets forth the basic factual circumstances of
plaintiffs' claims.

Numbers II through IV purport to state claims

for medical negligence against defendants, Primary Children's
Hospital, Primary Children's Medical Center, Intermountain Health
Care, The Health Services Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints,2 Garth Meyers, M.D., L. George Veasy, M.D.,

2

These defendants are collectively referred to herein as the
"Hospital defendants."

Karen Bowman, R.N,3 and unnamed defendants.

Numbers V through

VIII purport to state claims against all defendants including Scott
Wetzel Services, Inc. (-Wetzel") and The Home Group, Inc. ("Home
Group-) for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In December 1985, the Medical and Hospital Defendants
moved for summary judgment and dismissal.

(R. 38, 88.)

The

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, heard the motions on
February 5, 1986.

(R. 384-457.)

After taking the matter under

advisement, Judge Wilkinson granted the medical and hospital
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal.
282.)

(R. 280,

Plaintiffs' appeal (Appeal No. 860230) followed.
On April 15, 1986, defendants Wetzel and Home Group filed

their Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal.

(R. 309.)

motions were heard before Judge Wilkinson on May 30, 1986.

The
Judge

Wilkinson granted Wetzel and Home Groups' Motion for Summary
Judgment from the bench.

(R. 380, 381.)

This appeal (Appeal No.

860392) followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The factual background has been thoroughly presented in
the Medical and Hospital Defendants' Respondents' Brief in Appeal
No. 860230.

To avoid unnecessary repetition, Wetzel and Home Group

3

These defendants are collectively referred to as the
"Medical defendants."
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adopt the Statement of Facts as found in the Respondents' Brief in
Appeal No. 860230 (for the Court's convenience, the Statement of
Facts is attached in an addendum to this Brief at pages 1 to 5),
with the following additions.
Defendant Wetzel is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Home
Group engaged in the business of accident investigation and
adjustment.4

Wetzel and Home Group are separate corporations.

Intermountain Health Care ( M IHC M ) contracted with Wetzel to
investigate malpractice claims against IHC and its agents.
Pursuant to the contract with IHC, Wetzel investigated plaintiffs1
claims.

(R. 291-293, A. 6-8.) 5
Wetzel's involvement with Plaintiffs has been limited.

In

1982, Plaintiffs met with Scott Olsen, the manager of Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc.

At that meeting, Mr. Olsen indicated to Plaintiffs

that in his opinion Dr. Veasey and Dr. Meyers were "much too
professional to cover anything up" concerning the cause of Jennifer
Chapman's injuries.

(R. 361.)

met personally with Plaintiffs.

On May 27, 1983, Mr. Olsen again
At that time, Plaintiffs alleged

4

Defendant Home Group's only involvement in this case is its
ownership of Wetzel. Although plaintiffs allege that Home Group
insured some of the defendants on these claims, the record clearly
establishes that Home Group did not in fact insure any of the
defendants at the time plaintiffs' claims arose. (R. 293, 294,
A. 7, 8.)
5

For the Court's convenience, the affidavit of Scott Olsen,
the Manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., filed in support of
Wetzel and Home Groups Motion for Summary Judgment, is attached
hereto in the addendum at pages 6 to 8. The designation "A
"
refers to the addendum to this Brief.

-3-

that Jennifer had been injured in February 1973 because there had
not been a prompt response to her cardiac arrest.

Mr. Olsen's

written response to plaintiffs' claims stated that he had checked
with the doctors involved in the treatment of Jennifer and that
they agreed that the problem she experienced was an emboli reaching
her brain causing the seizure and leading to the cardiac arrest.
(R. 249-252, A. 9-12.) 6
On July 13, 1983, Mr. Chapman once again telephoned
Mr. Olsen, alleging that the injury to Jennifer in connection with
heart surgery in Primary Children's Medical Center in February
1973, was the result of the negligence of the Medical and Hospital
Defendants.

Mr. Chapman demanded $350,000 in compensation.

Mr.

Olsen advised Mr. Chapman that Wetzel had set up a file on the
matter in 1978 when Dr. Veasey had met with plaintiffs and their
attorney, Stephen Crockett, concerning their claims against the
Medical and Hospital Defendants; that his office had reviewed
plaintiffs' claims at that time, concluding there was no negligence
or liability, and that a recent review of that matter reaffirmed
the original conclusions.

(R. 249-252, A. 9-12.)

In all of plaintiffs' conversations with Wetzel, they
asserted the same medical malpractice claims raised in their
present complaint.

*For the Courts convenience, the affidavit of Scott Olsen,
Manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., filed in support of the
medical and hospital defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is
attached hereto in the addendum at pages 9-12.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Affidavits do not create
disputed issues of fact requiring this Court to reverse the Trial
Court's judgment on the fraud and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims.

The alleged representations of Wetzel

giving rise to plaintiffs' claims for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress are three statements, wherein,
Wetzel's manager, Scott Olsen refuted plaintiffs' claims for
medical negligence and reiterated the medical defendants' opinions
that Jennifer's injuries were caused by an emboli reaching her
brain.

This continues to be the position and opinion of these

defendants to this date.

Representations of opinion and

affirmative denials of allegations are insufficient as a matter of
law to constitute the basis for a claim for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, the Trial Court

correctly ruled that Wetzel committed no intentional torts against
plaintiffs.
The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Home Group's
only involvement in this action is its ownership of Wetzel.

Home

Group's ownership of Wetzel is an insufficient basis for a claim
for damages against Home Group.

Accordingly, the Trial Courts

judgment granting Home Group's Motion for Summary Judgment should
be affirmed.
Plaintiffs' Complaint is unclear as to whether Plaintiffs
allege claims against Wetzel and Home Group for medical negligence.
To the extent such claims are alleged, they are barred by the
-5-

limitations provision in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

The

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act contains a statute of limitations
which in this case, bars plaintiffs' medical negligence claims
filed after April 2, 1980.

Wetzel, as an agent of the Hospital

Defendants, is entitled to the same protection under the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act as the Hospital and Medical
Defendants.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims for medical negligence

are barred by the statute of limitations of the Utah Healthcare
Malpractice Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
WETZEL COMMITTED NO INTENTIONAL TORTS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS.
Plaintiffs' Complaint includes claims for fraud, inten-

tional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District

Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, granted Wetzel and Home Groups' Motion for Summary
Judgment on plaintiffs' claims for fraud, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Court's decision precluding plaintiffs' claims are correct as a
matter of law.
A.

The Untroverted Facts Establish That Wetzel Made No
Representations That Can Serve as a Basis for a Claim of
Fraud.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Pace v. Parrish, 247

P.2d 273 (Utah 1952), set forth the elements of the cause of action
for fraud:

-6-

This being an action in deceipt based on
fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden was
upon Plaintiffs to prove all of the essential
elements thereof. These are: (1) that a
representation was made; (2) concerning a
presently-existing material fact; (3) which was
false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew
to be false or (b) made recklessly knowing that
he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that
the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his injury and damage.
Id. at 275-75.

Plaintiffs' claim in this case fails as a claim for

fraud because it fails to state the above elements with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because the representations alleged by Plaintiffs cannot serve as a
basis for a fraud claim as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Affidavits allege only three
representations by Wetzel.

The first occurred in a meeting

attended by Dr. Veasy, Mr. Chapman and Scott Olsen.

According to

Mr. Chapman, Mr. Olsen made the statement that Doctors Veasy and
Meyers were "much too professional to cover anything up concerning
the cause of Jennifer's injury."

(R. 361.)

The second

representation was in a letter written by Scott Olsen to
Mr. Chapman.

The letter states simply that Wetzel had conducted an

investigation of the incident in 1977 and that the doctors were
and still are —

—

of the opinion that Jennifer's condition resulted

from emboli reaching the child's brain.

(R. 249-252, A. 9-12.)

Finally, in a telephone conversation on July 13, 1983, Mr. Olsen
reaffirmed the original conclusions.

-7-

(R. 249-252, A. 9-12.)

These representations do not constitute representations of the sort
that can give rise to a claim for fraud.

They are expressions of

opinion which cannot constitute representations of fact for
purposes of fraud.

Poison Company v. Imperial Cattle Company, 624

P.2d 993, 996 (Mont. 1981).

Because the alleged representations of

Wetzel are merely expressions of opinion and not representations of
fact, plaintiffs' claim of fraud is insufficient as a matter of law
and the Trial Court's ruling on this issue should be affirmed.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiffs Have No
Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional

distress must meet the standards set forth in the decision of the
Utah Supreme Court in Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961):
Our study of the authorities and of the
arguments advanced, convinces us that, conceding
such a cause of action may not be based upon mere
negligence, the best considered view recognizes
an action for severe emotional distress, though
not accompanied by bodily impact or physical
injury, where the defendant intentionally engaged
in some conduct toward the Plaintiff, (a) with
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or
(b) where any reasonable person would have known
that such would result; and his actions are of
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and
intolerable in that they offend against the
generally accepted standards of decency and
morality.
Id. at 346-47.
Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress rests on their allegations that Defendants concealed "the
cause of Jennifer Chapman's injury so that no claim would or could
be made against the hospital and physician Defendants . . .".

-8-

(Appellants' Brief at p. 16.)

As indicated above, Mr. Olsen's

statements denying plaintiffs' claims of medical malpractice and
reaffirming the medical defendants' opinions as to the cause of
Jennifer's injuries are insufficient, as a matter of law, for a
claim of fraud or fraudulent concealment.

These denials of

liability and statements of opinion are also insufficient as the
basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiffs argue that the evidence must go to the jury fo
a factual determination.

However, the case cited by plaintiffs in

support of their argument, Burgess v. Perdue, 721 P.2d 239 (Kan.
1986), requires the Court to make two threshold determinations
before the matter is given to the jury.

In Burgess, the trial

court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the summary

judgment and stated:
[2] Liability for extreme emotional
distress has two threshold requirements which the
court must first determine exist. The requirements are: (1) Whether the defendant's conduct
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery; and (2) whether
the emotional distress suffered by plaintiff was
of such an extreme degree that the law must
intervene because the distress inflicted was so
severe that no reasonable person should be
expected to endure it. If the court determines
from the pleadings, stipulatons, admissions, and
depositions of the parties that reasonable
factfinders might differ as to whether defendant's
conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous
and the plaintiff's emotional distress was
genuine and so severe and extreme that it caused
injury, then it must be left to the jury to
determine liability.
Id. at 242.

In this case, reasonable factfinders could not differ as
to whether Mr. Olsen's denials of liability and reaffirmations of
the medical defendants' opinions consitute extreme and outrageous
conduct giving rise to a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling on this

issue should be affirmed.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiffs Have No
Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that no claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress exists in the State of
Utah.

In Samms v. Eccles, supra, the court stated that a claim for

emotional distress cannot be based in Utah upon "mere negligence."
This view was recently affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Reiser
v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982).

Accordingly, the Trial

Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs have no claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CLAIM AGAINST THE HOME GROUP, INC.
Although plaintiffs' Complaint does allege that Home Group
insured some or all of the defendants in this case and that Wetzel
was acting for Home Group in its investigation for the Hospital
Defendants, these allegations, even if true, do not constitute a
claim for damages.

In fact, these allegations are without basis.

The Home Group wrote no insurance covering any of the defendants in
the case at the time these claims arose.

The undisputed facts are

that Wetzel and Home Group are separate corporations.

»10-

The only

relationship between the two corporations is that Wetzel is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Home Group.

The Home Group's ownership

of Wetzel is insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute a
claim for damages against Home Group.

(R. 293, 294, A. 7,8.)

See,

e.g., Rick v. RLC Corp., 535 F. Supp. 39, 44 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(applying Mich, law); Bischofshausen, Vasbinder, and Luckie v. D.W.
Jaquays Min. and Equipment Contractors, Co., 700 P.2d 902, 907 (Az.
App. 1985); Peterick v. State, 589 P.2d 250, 263-265 (Wash. App.
1978).

Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling with respect to Home

Group should be affirmed.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE UTAH HEALTH
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT
It is unclear from plaintiffs' Complaint whether they have

alleged claims for medical negligence against Wetzel and Home
Group.

To the extent such claims are alleged, they are barred by

the limitations provision in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
The applicable statute of limitations for claims for medical
negligence is set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
§ 78-14-1, et seg., UTAH CODE ANN.

It provides:

(1) No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed
four years after the date of the alleged act,
omissions, neglect, or occurrence, except that:

-11-

(b) In an action where it is alleged
that a patient has been prevented from
discovering this conduct on the part of a
health care provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered
the fraudulent concealment, whichever first
occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall
apply to all persons, regardless of minority or
other legal disability under section 78-12-36, or
any other provision of the law, and shall apply
retroactively to all persons, partnerships,
associations and corporations, and to all health
care providers and to all malpractice actions
against nealth care providers based upon alleged
personal injuries which occurred prior to the
effective date of this Act; provided, however,
that any action which under former law could have
been commenced after the effective date of this
Act may be commenced only within the unelapsed
portion of time allowed under former law; but any
action which under former law could have been
commenced more than four years after the
effective date of this Act may be commenced only
within four years after the effective date of
this Act.
(§ 78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANN.)
It is undisputed that the acts upon which the alleged
medical negligence claims are based occurred in 1973.

Although

Jennifer Chapman was a minor at that time, section 78-14-4 UTAH
CODE ANN. applies "to all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability and shall apply retroactively . . . H .

To be

timely, plaintiffs' Complaint had to be filed within four years
after the effective date of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
The effective date of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was

-12-

April 2, 1976.

Accordingly, the last date on which Plaintiffs1

claims could have been brought was April 2, 1980, or four years
after the effective date of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint with the
Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on October
8, 1985.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims for medical negligence

are barred by section 78-14-4 UTAH CODE ANN.
A.

Wetzel and Home Group Are Health Care Providers as
Defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
The term "health care provider- is defined in Utah Health

Care Malpractice Act:
(1) "Health Care Provider" includes any
person, partnership, association, corporation or
other facility or institution who causes to be
rendered or who renders health care or
professional services as a hospital, physician,
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse
midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist,
clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist,
physical therapist, podiatrist, pyschologist,
chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician,
osteopathic physician and surgeon, odiologist,
speech pathologist, certified social worker,
social service worker, social service aide,
marriage and family counselor, or practitioner of
obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and
service relating to or arising out of the health
care needs of persons or groups of persons, and
officers, employees, or agents of any of the
above acting in the course and scope of their
employment.
§ 78-14-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Wetzel is the agent of the Hospital
Defendants; IHC contracted with Wetzel to investigate claims of
malpractice against IHC and its agents (R. 291-293, A. 6-8.)

-13-

In

their Complaint, Plaintiffs admit the agency relationship between
IHC and Wetzel:
. . . The reason for the failure to discover
such negligence was due to the negligent and/or
intentional fraudulent concealment of the cause
of plaintiffs injury by defendants and/or their
agents or employees including Wetzel and/or The
Home Group.
(Plaintiffs1 Complaint at 1[ 14.)
Since Wetzel is the agent of the Hospital Defendants — a
fact alleged by Plaintiffs and assumed to be true —

all claims

for medical negligence against Wetzel are barred by the statute of
limitations in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
B.

The Statute of Limitations of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act Is Not Tolled by Estoppel.
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the bar of the statute of

limitations by arguing that a disputed factual issue exists
regarding misrepresentations by the Hospital and Medical Defendants
and Wetzel concerning the true cause of the injury suffered by
Jennifer Chapman.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides:

(b) In an action where it is alleged that a
patient has been prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a health care provider
because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
§ 78-14-4(1)(b), UTAH CODE ANN.

In essence, this section requires

affirmative action by a health care provider preventing a plaintiff
from discovering misconduct on the part of the health care provider.

-14-

The undisputed facts in this case establish that Wetzel
did nothing to prevent Plaintiffs from discovering the facts
underlying their claims for medical negligence.
As set forth above, Plaintiffs allege only three representations by Wetzel; a statement by Mr. Olsen that Drs. Veasy and
Meyers were "much too professional to cover anything up concerning
the cause of Jennifer's injury", and a letter and telephone
conversation denying Plaintiffs* allegations of medical negligence
and reaffirming the medical defendants opinion that Jennifer's
condition resulted from emboli reaching her brain.

(R. 249-252,

361, 362, A. 9-12.)
These representations do not constitute representations of
the sort that can give rise to a claim of fraudulent concealment.
All are mere expressions of opinion denying plaintiffs' accusation
of wrongdoing and cannot, therefore, "constitute fraudulent concealment" for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations.

Clark

v. Airesearch Manufacturing Company of Arizona, Inc., 673 P.2d 984,
987 (Ariz. App. 1983).
Even if these representations could constitute a fraudulent
concealment, it is clear that Plaintiffs were not deceived by these
representations.

An allegation of fraudulent concealment does not

toll a statute of limitations if reasonable inquiry on the part of
Plaintiffs would have revealed the claimed fraud prior to the time
of filing their complaint.

Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50, 52

(Utah 1978); McKonkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801, 802 (Utah 1974).
Plaintiffs' belief that medical malpractice occurred existed prior
-15-

to and continued through and after plaintiffs' conversations and
correspondence with Mr, Olsen.

All of the facts in the complaint

filed in 1985 were known or could readily have been known in 1973.
Since at least 1977, Plaintiffs were represented by six different
attorneys employed with respect to the malpractice alleged in this
case.

(R. 108, 109 and 257.)

In addition, Mr. Chapman wrote a

letter on or about May 2, 1977, suggesting that Mr. Chapman
believed he had a claim for malpractice against the Medical
Defendants in this case.

(R. 111-118.)

These facts indicate that

well before the representations were made by Mr. Olsen, Plaintiffs
believed that they had a claim for malpractice against the Medical
and Hospital Defendants in this case.

Accordingly, Wetzel's

representations do not, as a matter of law, toll the statute of
limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
C.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and Its Statute of
Limitations Are Constitutional.
The constitutionality of the statute of limitations in the

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act has been thoroughly briefed by the
Medical and Hospital Defendants in the Respondents' Brief in Appeal
No. 860230.

To avoid unnecessary repetition, Wetzel and Home Group

adopt the argument presented in Respondent's Brief (for the court's
convenience, Respondents argument on this issue is attached in the
Addendum at pages 13-38.)
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court properly ruled that the statute of
limitations in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act bars
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plaintiffs' medical negligence claims and that the representations
of Wetzel are an insufficient basis, as a matter of law, for claims
of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress•

In

addition, the Trial Court properly ruled that Utah law does not
provide a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or a
claim for damages against a corporation based solely on its
ownership of a subsidiary corporation.

Accordingly, this Court

should affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of Wetzel and
Home Group.
DATED this

day of November, 1986.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

^cuUs S~ Y)/MA*H*—-

Stephen B. Nebeker
Anthony B. Quinn
Paul D. Newman

Attorneys for Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc. and The Home
Group, Inc.
0791n
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned, attorney for Respondents Scott Wetzel
Services, Inc. and The Home Group, Inc., hereby certifies that on
November

, 1986, he caused to be served the foregoing

Respondents' Brief on all parties to this Appeal by mailing four
(4) copies thereof by first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed
to their attorneys as follows:
KATHRYN COLLARD, ESQ.
401 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
P. RICHARD MEYER, ESQ.
ROBERT N. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
P.O. Box 2608
Jackson, Wyoming 83001
DATED this Jl9 ^ day of November, 1986,

0791n
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ADDENDUM INDEX
Medical and Hospital Defendant's
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A-l to A-5

Affidavit of Scott Olsen

A-6 to A-8

Affidavit of Scott Olsen

A-9 to A-12

Medical and Hospital Defendant's
Argument Re: Constitutionality
of § 78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

A-13 to A-38
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In December 1985, defendant Garth Myer, M.D. filed a

motion to oisi^iss and defendants L. George Veasy, M.D., Karen
Bowman, R.N., and rhehospital defendants moved for summary
judgment and dismissal.

(It>^8, 88.)

These motions were heard

before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on February 5, 1986.
After taking the matter under advisementfx*9uitoe Wilkinson granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment and disml**^l.
282.)

Plaintiffs' appeal followed.

(R. 267,
^*^\

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jennifer Chapman, now 14-years old, was born on August
10, 1972, and was treated for "blue spells" by doctors in Ogden
for the first five to seven months of her life.

She was then

referred to the Primary Children's Medical Center and was
admitted by defendant L. George Veasy, M.D.

(R. 141.)

On or about February 14, 1973, an operation to install
a device called a Waterston Shunt was performed by a doctor who
was not a named defendant.

The purpose of that operation was to

increase the flow of blood to Jennifer's lungs.

The operation

"over-corrected" the initial problem and on February 28, 1973 a
second operation was performed to modify the shunt.

(R. 141.)

A few hours after the operation Jennifer suffered a
cardiac arrest while she was in the recovery room.

Resuscitative

efforts saved Jennifer's life, but it was determined immediately

thereafter that she had sustained severe and irreversible brain
damage.

(R. 141-142.)
In the months and years following Jennifer's cardiac

arrest in 1973, her parents (plaintiffs) had several discussions
and considerable correspondence with defendant Veasy.

On several

of those occasions they alleged that medical negligence during
her hospital stay at the Primary Children's Medical Center in
February of 1973 caused Jennifer's impaired condition.
A-2; R. 256-257, A-20-A-21.)

(R. 107,

These facts are supported by the

affidavit of Dr. Veasy and were not disputed by plaintiffs.
As an example and as evidence of such allegations of
negligence made by the Chapmans, Dr. Veasy was able to produce a
hand-written letter from Robert Chapman to him which he received
sometime prior to May 2, 1977.

(See Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of

L. George Veasy, M.D., and typed version immediately following
Exhibit "A".

R. Ill, A-6.)

Appellant Chapman wrote in his

letter that the "negligence is obvious".

(R. 117, A-12.)

Frequently since 1973 Dr. Veasy participated in
providing or coordinating medical care for Jennifer Chapman at
the request of her parents Robert Chapman and Teresa Chapman.
Based on his personal conversations and correspondence with the
Chapmans, Dr. Veasy said under oath that, "I know and state that
continuously since 1973 [the Chapmans] have believed, albeit
erroneously, that the episode which Jennifer Chapman experienced
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at Primary Children's Medical Center in February 1973 was
preventable and resulted from medical negligence by those who
attended her."

(R. 108, A-3.)

Between November of 1977 and July of 1985, plaintiffs
conferred with at least five different attorneys before their
present counsel became involved.

It is undisputed that various

attorneys representing the plaintiffs have contacted the
defendants regarding claims now asserted in plaintiffs' complaint
(R. 257, A-21), including but not limited to attorney Richard D.
Burbidge who contacted defendants in November 1977 and attorney
Stephen G. Crockett who contacted defendants in January 1979,
plus attorneys representing at least five additional law firms
thereafter.

(R. 108, 109, A-3, A-4.)

The events related in an affidavit of Scott Olsen were
also uncontradicted by the appellants.

(R. 249, A-14.)

Essentially, Mr. Olsen, the manager of Scott Wetzel Services,
Inc., an insurance adjustment agency in Salt Lake City, Utah,
related that on several different occasions the Chapmans had
asserted the same medical malpractice claims as now raised in
their present complaint.

As he related, on May 27, 1983 he

personally met with Robert and Teresa Chapman, with Jennifer also
present.

At that time the Chapmans alleged that Jennifer had

been injured in February 1973 in connection with problems that
developed following the second cardiac operation, because there

4

had not been a prompt response to Jennifer's cardiac arrest.
(R. 250, A-15.)
On July 13, 1983 Robert Chapman again phoned Mr. Olsen,
again alleging that injury to his daughter Jennifer in connection
with heart surgery at Primary Children's Medical Center in
February 1973 was the result of negligence by Dr. Veasy, Dr.
Myers, Primary Children's Medical Center and/or some of its
employees.

He was advised that Mr. Olsen's office had set up a

file on this matter in 1978 when Dr. Veasy had met with the
Chapmans and their attorney, Stephen Crockett, concerning their
claims against Primary Children's Medical Center and others; that
his office had reviewed the Chapman's claims at that time, and
had concluded there was no negligence or liability.
15.)

(R. 250, A-

In both the claims registered by the Chapmans in 1978 and

1983, they alleged the same malpractice, that is, that Jennifer
had suffered brain damage by a hypoxic insult that was due to the
failure of Nurse Bowman to recognize the alleged cardiac arrest
of Jennifer Chapman.

(R. 253, A-18.)

In December 1985 after plaintiffs' present counsel
filed suit, counsel for defendants moved for summary judgment
alleging, among other things, that plaintiffs' alleged causes of
action were barred by the applicable statute of limitations
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

5-

(R. 38,

A-4

88.)

The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of

all defendants.

(R. 282.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In\1976 the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Health
Care Malpractioe Act to protect the public from adverse effects
of the rising incidents and cost of medical malpractice claims.
This Court on several prior occasions has upheld that the
constitutionality of the Act, including the statute of
limitations.

\

It is well-settled that it is within the Legislature's
prerogative to determine whether a statute of limitations applies
or is tolled with respect to minors# claims.

Minors have no

inherent constitutional exemption\from the operation of a statute
of limitations.

The legislative intent in this instance is

unequivocally clear that in the public^s interest minors' claims
against health care providers must be timely filed.

Legislative

intent distinguishes this circumstance fronk the court decisions
in other cases upon which appellants rely.

\

In harmony with federal and foreign state decisions,
this Court has consistently applied a rational basis test to
determine if a statute unconstitutionally denies guarantees of
equal protection and access to courts.

The Court has previously

determined that the Legislature may properly treat health\care
providers as a separate class, and it is abundantly clear that
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STEPHEN B. NEBEKER (A2371) and
ANTHONY B. QUINN (A2672) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendants
Scott Wetzel Company and
The Home Group, Inc.
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and
through her guardian,
TERESA CHAPMAN, ROBERT CHAPMAN
and TERESA CHAPMAN, individually,
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT OLSEN
Plaintiffs,

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL,
a hospital organized to do
business in the State of Utah;
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL
CENTER, a hospital organized
to do business in the State
of Utah; INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH
CARE, a Utah corporation dba
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL;
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba PRIMARY
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; THE HEALTH
SERVICES CORPORATION OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a former or
present Utah corporation dba
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL;
GARTH MEYERS, M.D.; L. GEORGE
VEASY, M.D.; KAREN BOWMAN, R.N.;
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY, a Utah

Civil No. C-85-6782
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

A-6

corporation; THE HOME GROUP,
INC., a foreign corporation;
JOHN DOE I-X; and BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V,

:
:

Defendants.
00O00

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
* ss
)

Scott Olsen being first duly sworn deposes and states that:
1. He is the manager of the Salt Lake office of Scott
Wetzel Services, Inc.
2.

Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. was incorporated in the

State of Washington on January 29, 1971.
3.

One hundred percent of the stock of Scott Wetzel

Services, Inc. was purchased by The Home Group, Inc. on January 11,
1973.
4.

The document attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the

copy of the contract between Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and the
Intermountain Health Care which was in effect at the time the file
was opened in this matter.
5. All of the efforts of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. done
in connection with the investigation of the Chapmans* claim were
done pursuant to the agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
None of the investigative or other services performed by Wetzel
were performed on behalf of The Home Group, Inc.

6.

The Home Group, Inc. did not issue any insurance

policy covering any of the defendants named in the Complaint at the
time the claim arose.
7. The predecessor of Intermountain Health Care was
covered by two policies in 1973: one issued by Reserve Insurance
Company and the other by Appalachian Insurance Company.
8. The predecessor of Intermountain Health Care had a
self-insured retention of $25,000 at the time the claim arose.
DATED this

day of April, 1986.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of April,

1986

My Commission Expires

i9-

Notary/
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah

l-??
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B. Lloyd Poelman - A2617
David B. Erickson - A3788
KIRTON, McCONKIE 6 BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendant
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN,
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA
CHAPMAN, individually,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF
SCOTT OLSEN
Civil No. C85-6782

vs.
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a
hospital organized to do business
in the State of Utah, et al.

(HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON)

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

The undersigned Scott Olsen, being first duly sworn on
oath deposes and says:
1.

I am the manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., an

insurance adjustment agency in Salt Lake City, Utah, which for
many years has represented Primary Children's Medical Center and
its predecessors in matters of legal liability claimed against
the hospital and its agents.

feConkla
•hn*M
ial CwDorsMn j
no EAST
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I have been employed by Scott

Wetzel Services, Inc. since 1976 and I am familiar with this
agency's records relating to claims by Jennifer Chapman and her
parents against Primary Children's Medical Center and others
relating to surgery performed on Jennifer Chapman in February
1973.
2.

On May 27, 1983 I met personally with Robert and

Teresa Chapman, with Jennifer also present. At that time the
Chapmans alleged that Jennifer had been injured in February 1973
in connection with problems that developed following a second
cardiac operation, because there had not been a prompt response
to Jenniferfs cardiac arrest.

On June 17, 1983 I wrote a letter

to Robert Chapman, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
-A".
3.

On July 13, 1983 Robert Chapman telephoned me,

again alleging that injury to his daughter Jennifer in connection
with heart surgery at Primary Children's Medical Center in
February 1973 was the result of negligence by Dr. Veasy, Dr.
Meyers, Primary Children's Medical Center and/or some of its
employees.

He demanded $350,000 in compensation.

I again

advised him that we had set up a file on this matter in 1978 when
Dr. Veasy had met with the Chapmans and their attorney, Stephen
Crockett, concerning their claims against Primary Children's
Medical Center and others; that we had reviewed their claims at
that time, concluding there was no negligence or liability; and
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that again more recently we had reviewed the matter and
reaffirmed our original conclusions.

Mr. Chapman became very

abusive to me over the telephone.
4.

On July 23, 1985 I sent a letter to Black fc Moore,

attorneys for the Chapmans, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B".

Before sending that letter I again carefully

reviewed the files of our offices. The statements in Exhibit "B"
accurately reflect the results of that review of our file on this
claim.
5.

I have read the foregoing and declare the content

thereof to be true of my own knowledge, except as to matters set
forth upon information and belief, and as to such matters I
believe them to be true.

Scott Olsen
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of

February, 1986.

Notary
My Commission Expires:

•cConkte
»hn«H
* i Corporator j
IO0EAST
kKE CITY
•4111

Arl*y>

/

^S

Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
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Scott Wetzel Services Incorporated
An Affiliate of The Home Group, tnc

833 East 400 South, Suite 104 •

Saft Lake City, Utah 84102

Phone (801) 322-2541

June 17, 1983

Dbert Chapman
597 South 1100 West
iverdale, Utah 84403
E:

Insured: Primary Children's Medical Center
Clainent: Jennifer Chapman (minor)
D/LDSS:
2-28-73
Our File: 112-47-73

ear Mr. Chapman:
enjoyed the visit we had on May 27, 1983 with you and your wife and Jennifer.
was able to go back in our files and find that a claim had been set up concerning your child back in 1977. We at that tire, checked with the doctors involved
n the treatment of Jennifer and they all agreed that the problem that she
ixperienced was caused by an emboli reaching your child's brain which caused the
seizure and that led to the cardiac arrest. They have not changed their opinion
it this time, so as you can see, I have to rely on the doctor's diagnosis of
our child's problem.
is to the other things we spoke of during the meeting, I feel that it will be
ecessary for you to follow-up with therapy and any other treatment that your
hild does now or should receive.
don't know what else I can do at the present time to help you, but I will be
ore than happy to listen to whatever suggestions you may have. Please feel free
JO call at any time at the above number.
Very truly yours,

Scott Olsen
»/ll
:/c Charles Doane, Prinary Children's Medical Center

A-l^r>
EXHIBIT "A"

buffered from extreme lack of oxygen and sustained permanent'
braih\damage."

(R. 6.)

Under the undisputed facts, any claimed

medical malpractice was thus complete at the time of the February
1973 injury.^Even if continuing negligence were adequately
alleged, the statute still runs from the time of discovery of the
injury and not from thVtermination of a physician-patient
relationship.

N.

Note that even the Peteler court decision relied on by
the appellants recognized that vherVnegligent treatment is not
continuing, the statute of limitations oar would be complete.
See Peteler v. Robison. 81 Utah 535,

, 17\^.2d at 249. To the

extent that Peteler could be read to hold otherwise, it was
specifically disapproved in Christiansen v. Rees, 20 wtah 2d 199,
436 P.2d 435 (1968).

The statute of limitations thus barsythe

appellants' action.
III.

THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND ITS STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.
Appellants have devoted the greater part of their brief

to attacking the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act statute of limitations. A review of pertinent
case law will show that every Utah court which has tested the
constitutionality of the Act under the theories raised by
appellants has rejected the same constitutional arguments which
appellants now assert.
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A.

Utah Case Law Precedents.
In reaching its decision to uphold Utah Code Annotated

§ 78-14-4, the Court can rely on a long line of Utah Supreme
Court decisions which have strongly and consistently upheld the
provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act, including its
statute of limitations, against constitutional challenges. See,
e.g., Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah
1981); Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah
1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786
(Utah 1979); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978).
Federal courts reviewing constitutional challenges to
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act have also uniformly upheld
the validity of § 78-14-4. See, e.g., Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d
600 (10th Cir. 1983); Hargett v. Limberq, 598 F.Supp. 152 (D.
Utah 1984).
This Court's decision in Allen v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., supra, is typical of the support the Court has given
to enactments by the Utah Legislature in the area of medical
malpractice.

In Allen the Court unanimously rejected the

plaintiff's argument that the shortened statute of limitations
for medical malpractice cases violates constitutional guarantees
of equal protection.

The Court held that:

(1) the Utah

"legislature exercised its discretionary prerogative in
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determining that the shortening of the statute of limitations
. . . would insure the continued availability of health care
services,"; and (2) such action does not exceed constitutional
prohibitions.

635 P.2d at 32 (footnote omitted).

Appellants apparently acknowledge that Allen was
properly decided (Appellants' Brief at 32) and that the
Legislature may rationally limit the time for filing malpractice
claims as to adults, but argue it may not so limit minor's
claims.

Appellants' argument overlooks, however, the fundamental

principle that the legislature may place minors on equal footing
with adults without infringing their constitutional rights. As
explained in Vance v. Vancef 108 U.S. 514 (1883):
The Constitution of the United States . • • gives
to minors no special rights beyond others, and it
is within the legislative competency of the State
. . . to make exceptions in their favor or not.
The exemptions from the operation of statutes of
limitation, usually accorded to infants and
married women, do not rest upon any general
doctrine of the law that they cannot be subjected
to their action, but in every instance upon
express language in those statutes giving them
time after majority . . . to assert their rights.
Id. at 521.

See also Grellet v. City of New York, 504 N.Y.S.2d

671, 673 (A.D.2 Dept. 1986) (medical malpractice action not
tolled by plaintiff's infancy); Licano v. Karusnick, 663 P.2d
1066, 1068 (Colo. App. 1983) (the legislature is the primary
judge of whether the time period allowed to a minor is
reasonable);
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Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d
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891, 893 (1980) (legislature is not under any constitutional
mandate to suspend operation of statutes of limitation in cases
of infancy or incapacity); 51 Am. Jur. 2d 750, Limitation of
Actions § 182 (1970) (minority does not per se bestow immunity
upon an infant or his guardian without a legislative saving in
his favor, and a statute of limitations will ordinarily run
against the claims of infants in the absence of a contrary
statute)•
This principle was reaffirmed by the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Utah in Hargett
v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984).

In that decision the

federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
health care providers, holding that the minor plaintiff's claim
was barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations.

In

doing so the court considered and rejected the same constitutional attack the appellants have launched in their opposition to
these defendants' motions.

The court's opinion recognizes as

"universally accepted" the rule that a "legislature may put
adults and infants on the same footing with respect to statutes
of limitation without affecting constitutional rights."

Id. at

156.
Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion
with respect to operation of the statute of limitations against
minors' claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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See, e.g.,
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Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971# 972 (10th Cir. 1980)
("It is well established that a claimant's minority does not toll
the running of the statute of limitations under the Federal Tort
Claims Act*); Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir.
1965) (minority does not toll the statute of limitations, and
parents or guardians of a minor must preserve a claim by timely
action); Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir.)/
cert, denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (equal protection guarantees
are not violated by applying a shortened statute of limitations
to a minor's claim)•
Sound state and federal case precedents clearly show
that the statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, which places adults and minors on equal footing,
is a constitutional exercise of legislative prerogative and a
rational response to the stated legislative purpose of addressing
a crisis in the availability of medical malpractice insurance and
its attendant effect upon the quality of health care in the State
of Utah.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977).

B.

Scott v. School Board of Granite School District Did
Not Invalidate the Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations as Applied to Minors' Claims.
The primary thrust of appellants' argument is that the

Court has already declared the statute of limitations of
§ 78-14-4 as applied to minors unconstitutional in Scott v.
School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah

A-17
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1977).

The statutory provision at issue in Scott was Utah Code

Ann. § 63-30-13 (1977), the notice of claim provision of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.
(1977)•

Appellants contend that the sweeping dictum "in all

cases" contained in the Court's opinion invalidated not only
§ 63-30-13, but all provisions which limit the effect of the
general tolling provision for minor's claims set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-36(1) (1977).
Appellants' reading of Scott overstates the Court's
holding.

Scott is not a case of constitutional dimension; it is,

rather, an example of judicial interpretation of statutes to
further the Legislature's intent and objectives.
A line of Utah cases prior to Scott had held that the
tolling provisions of § 78-12-36 did not excuse a minor's failure
to timely file the notice of claim required by § 63-30-13 before
commencing an action against a political subdivision of the
state.

See, e.g., Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435

(1973).
In 1973, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-7-77, a notice of claim provision relating to certain claims
against cities or incorporated towns which was similar in content
and effect to § 63-30-13.1

The amendment provided:

x

Section 10-7-77 was later repealed by Laws 1978 ch. 27,

§ 12.
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If the person for whom a claim is made is a minor, then
the claims covered by this section may be so presented
within the time limits specified above or within one
year after the person reaches the age of majority,
whichever is longer.
In Scott the Court found that this amendment, coupled
with the Legislature's enactment of the general tolling provision
in § 78-12-36(1), made it "abundantly clear" that the Legislature's general intent at that time was to protect minors' claims
against governmental entities.

568 P.2d at 748.

Given that

legislative intent, and the similarities between the two notice
of claim provisions, the Court was unable to find any reason for
the 1973 Legislature's failure to similarly amend § 63-30-13.
The Court therefore held that the legislative intent which
resulted in the aonendment of § 10-7-77 also applied to § 63-30-13
and the minor's claim should be preserved.

The Court did not

declare § 63-30-13 unconstitutional, but simply overruled a prior
line of cases in deference to what the Court perceived to be a
new expression of legislative grace in favor of minors.
The Scott decision is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's prior rulings concerning judicial review of legislative
enactments.

The Court has stated that its primary responsibility

and purpose in interpreting statutory enactments is to give
effect to the underlying legislative intent.

Millett v. Clark

Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980).

The Court has also
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stated that it will avoid constitutional questions wherever
possible:
The right and power of the judiciary to declare
whether legislative enactments exceed constitutional limitations is to be exercised with
considerable restraint and in conformity with
fundamental rules. One such fundamental rule of
long-standing is that unnecessary decisions are to
be avoided and that the court should pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute only when such a
determination is essential to the decision in a
case. . . . An attack on the validity of a
statute cannot be made by parties whose interest
have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced
by the operation of the statute.
A further fundamental rule is that the courts do
not busy themselves with advisory opinions, nor is
it within their province to exercise the delicate
power pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in
abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases.
It has been found to be far wiser, and it has
become settled as a qeneral principle, that a
constitutional question is not to be reached if
the merits of the case in hand may be fairly
determined on other than constitutional issues.
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980).
The Scott decision is consistent with these rules of
judicial review.

The decision interpreted and gave full effect

to the perceived legislative intent.

It did not, however,

invalidate the notice of claim statute, nor did the Court review
and pass upon the constitutionality of any other statutory
provision not before the Court.
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IV.

SECTION 78-14-4 IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE
ENACTMENT.
A party who challenges a legislative enactment on

constitutional grounds bears a heavy burden of proof.

Judicial

review of a properly enacted law begins with the strong
presumption that the law is constitutional.
P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983).

State v. Murphy, 674

This Court has consistently

observed that it is not the function of the judiciary to second
guess the wisdom or propriety of legislation.
But the wisdom or propriety of
the legislation is
m
not for us to consider . . . there is, without
doubt, plenty of room, within the pale of the
Constitution, for ill-advised legislation. . . .
That is a matter between the people and the
representatives." . . . Within the limits of the
Constitution it is the prerogative of the legislature to control such matters, and the fact that an
act may be ill-advised or unfortunate, if such it
be, does not give rise to an appeal from the
Legislature to the courts for correction. . . .
Under our system of government it is important
that each branch thereof avoid infringement upon
the prerogatives of the other.
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. of Admin.f 122
Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (1952) [citations omitted]; see also
Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S. Ct.
715, 66 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1981).

By judicial mandate this court must

not interfere with the Legislature's exercise of its prerogative
unless a constitutional infringement is clearly established.
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981).
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A.

Standard of Review.
Appellants' challenge the constitutionality of

§ 78-14-4 as applied to minors on two grounds:

(1) the provision

violates guarantees of equal protection of laws found within the
United States and Utah Constitutions; and (2) the provision
violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution relating
to a litigant's right of access to the courts.2

The rational

basis standard of review is the appropriate standard for deciding
both of appellants' constitutional challenges.

See Malan v.

Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 14 (Utah 1984) (equal protection
rational basis analysis applies to review of rights guaranteed by
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution).
1.

Equal protection.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 24 of
the Utah Constitution embody the same fundamental principle:
"Persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 669.

^Article I, Section 11 provides: "All courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party."
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A statute may treat groups differently and still meet
constitutional equal protection and access to the courts
requirements if:

(1) the lav applies equally to all persons

within a class; and (2) the statutory classifications and different treatment given the classes have a reasonable tendency to
further the objectives of the statute.

Malan v. Levis, supra, at

670.
The rational basis standard of reviev cited above has
been used by the Utah Supreme Court in all its prior revievs of
the medical malpractice statute of limitations.

See, e.g., Allen

v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981)
(cited in Malan v. Levis, supra at 670). It is also the standard
of review used by nearly all other state appellate courts vhich
have revieved the constitutionality of their ovn respective
medical malpractice statutes.

See American Bank and Trust

Company v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204 Cal. Rptr.
671, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (1984) (citing 23 states and 3
federal circuits vhich have applied the rational basis standard
of reviev).

The "strict scrutiny* and "means-focus" standards of

reviev plaintiffs urge the court to adopt in this case are not
applied to legislation vhich does not create a "suspect class" or
affect a "fundamental constitutional right."

A-23
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Malan v. Levis,

supra at 674 n. 17.J

The United States District Court for the

District of Utah has already rejected the argument for applying a
"means-focus" review to a minor's constitutional challenge to the
Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations:
Unlike alienage, illegitimacy or gender, the class
of minors with medical malpractice claims does not
involve a fundamental interest or a classification
of a suspect character. • . •
The correct standard for equal protection
analysis to be applied in this case under both the
United States and Utah Constitutions is the
rational basis test.
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984) (citing
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186
(1981); Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984);
American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal.3d 359,
204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (1984); and Allen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981)).
Additional support for the principle that minors are
not a "suspect" class is found in nearly every jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Halet v. Wend Investment Company, 672 F.2d 1305, 1310
(9th Cir. 1982) ("children are not an 'insular minority'");
Williams v. City of Lewiston, Maine, 642 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.

4

The "means-focus" or "heightened scrutiny" analysis adopted
by such cases as Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), has
come under attack by other appellate courts. See e.g., Fitz v.
Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1983) ("We are unpersuaded by
the reasoning of Carson and decline to follow it.").
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1981) ("Minors are not a 'suspect' class"); Rollison v. Biggs,
567 F.Supp. 964, 972 n.14 (D. Del. 1983) ("courts have applied
the traditional rational relation test upon finding that
handicapped children do not constitute a suspect class")•

Colin

K. v. Schmidt, 536 F.Supp. 1375, 1388 (D.R.I. 1982) ("handicapped
children do not constitute a suspect class"); Hale v. City of
Santa Paula, 159 Cal. 3d 1233, 206 Cal. Rptr. 265# 270 (1984)
(rational relationship test is used to determine the validity of
a statute since minors are not a suspect class); Faucher v. City
of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me. 1983) (since age is not a
suspect classification, the legislative scheme should be upheld
if it bears some rational relationship to the conceivable
legitimate state interest or purpose).
2.

Access to courts.
Appellants have additionally challenged the statute of

limitations under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution.

These respondents do not believe, however, that

the appellants' open court argument is applicable to the facts of
this case.
In essence, appellants' arguments simply speaks to the
general question of whether there is denial of access to court
when there is discovery of an injury after a statute of
limitations has run, or when a minor does not have a parent or
guardian willing or able to bring an action on his behalf.

A-25
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Appellant has avoided the application of the cited law to the
facts in this case.

This case is distinguishable from Berry v.

Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), since in this
case there was discovery several years before the statute ran and
parents willing to assert the minor child's claim.
Section 78-14-4 is reasonable in its scope and
effect.

Appellant argues, though, that it may bar some causes of

action before they accrue.

Such a result is extremely unlikely

since section 78-14-4 expressly excludes from its operation the
tvo fact situations most likely

to be discovered more than four

years from the date of the treatment:

when a foreign object has

been wrongfully left within a patient's body, and when the health
care provider fraudulently conceals the alleged misconduct.

In

either case, the cause of action is not barred until after the
wrongful action has been or should have been discovered.

See

§ 78-14-4(1)(a)-(b). Since most other forms of wrongdoing are
typically discoverable within four years from the date of
occurrence, few causes of action ate barred before they arise.
Thus, when a cause of action is barred by the four-year statute
of repose, it is generally not because the claim has gone
undiscovered, but because the claimant has simply waited too long
to assert it.

The Utah Legislature found it necessary in the

public interest to bar stale claims so that professional
liability insurance premiums could be "reasonably and accurately
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calculated."

Id.

Old claims could be avoided.4

A specific

period within which claims could be brought was necessary to
reduce and stabilize spiraling health care costs and to ensure
continued quality health care services.
This same conclusion was reached in Wheaton v. Jack,
Civil No. C-82-0039 (D. Utah, Aug. 9, 1982) (attached at A-24).
There, the plaintiff filed her action in 1982, complaining of a
major surgery performed in 1966.

The plaintiff argued that the

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act unconstitutionally denied her
the right of access to the courts.

The federal court found that:

[T]he legislature was responding to a medical
malpractice crisis that was causing the cost of health
care to increase to the point that it threatened to be
available only to the rich. The legislature also found
that the quality of that care had diminished because
health care providers, in response to the numerous
suits being filed, were practicing defensive medicine
rather than providing the best care possible.
Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted); A-32, A-33.

Based on those

findings, the court concluded:
The overpowering public necessity of making available
the best health care possible justifies the abolition
of the right to access to the courts in medical
malpractice cases four years after the occurrence of
the act, omission, neglect or occurrence which caused
the injury. The legislature balanced the conflicting

limitation periods that have the effect of eliminating
stale claims are not improper. See Order of Railroad
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944) ; see also Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318, 320-21
(10th Cir. 1984).
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intersest and determined that there was no less onerous
alternative for alleviating the crisis. Therefore,
§ 78-14-4 does not violate article I, section 11 of the
Utah Constitution.
Id. at 10; A-33.
Appellants have also argued that the status of
"minority" deprives minors access to court.

It is true that in

minor injury cases the claim will have to be brought on the
child's behalf by his parent or guardian.

However, it is not

inequitable or improper to place some responsibility on parents
or guardians to protect and preserve a minor's claim for an
injury that accompanies a failure to diagnose or treat.

After

all, parents make daily choices during a child's minority which
certainly affect the child's future.

Parents choose, on the

minor's behalf, the extent of medical intervention and treatment
of a child's illnesses.

The Utah Legislature recognized this

responsibility by enacting § 78-14-4.
The statute of limitations in the Act is not irrational
merely because a parent as natural guardian or someone else as
guardian ad litem may need to pursue the child's cause of action
on the child's behalf.

In many instances parents have the

primary responsibility to protect, educate and care for their
children.

Some specific duties now placed on the parent for the

child's protection are set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-6
(parent or guardian may sue for death or injury of minor caused
by wrongful act or neglect of another); 78-45-3 (every man shall
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support his child); 78-45-9 (every man shall support his child);
78-45-9 (an obligee or state department of social services may
enforce a child's right of support against parent); 76-7-201
(failure to provide medical care is criminal neglect; see also 12
A.L.R.2d 1047).

Compare Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah

1976) (children have a right to support); Ottley v. Hill, 21 Utah
2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968) (parent under legal duty to pay
medical care); Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977) (parent
cannot rid himself of duty to support his children by contract);
Gavand v. Gawand, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980) (parent has duties to
support retarded child).

See also 34 A.L.R.2d 1460 (right of

child against parent for support). 5

Further, the Utah Supreme

Court has long recognized that a statute of limitations may run
against a minor where rights are vested in a parent or guardian.
Trinnaman v. dinger, 26 Utah 2d 111# 485 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1971);
Parr v. Zions First National Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d 461
(1962); Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936 (1903).

^Note also that parents are natural guardians of minor
children. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward § 5, and that a
guardian has not only a right, but a duty, to institute and
prosecute litigation necessary to maintain and preserve a ward's
rights. A guardian may also be liable for a loss caused by the
guardian's neglect or for breach of duty. Id. at §187. Parents
are not exempt from this duty. As natural guardians of the
child, they are the trustees of the child's rights which are
vested in the parents for the benefit of the child. Id. at
§ 8. They have a duty to protect and preserve the rights and
welfare of the children, id. at § 14, and are charged with the
care and management of the children's estates. Id. at § 48.
A-2 9
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B.

Application of Standard of Review,
The statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care

Malpractice Act, section 78-14*4, must be held to be a
constitutional exercise of the Utah Legislature's prerogative
unless appellants can clearly establish that the statute does not
meet the two-part test of the rational basis standard of
review.

To meet that test the statute must, first, apply equally

to all members of the created class. Malan v. Lewis, supra. The
class created and protected by the Act is health care
providers.

See Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 634

P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) ("The test . . . is whether there exists
a rational basis to treat health care providers differently from
other alleged tort feasors . . . .").

Section 78-14-4 applies

equally to all health care providers and therefore complies with
the first prong of the rational basis test.

The statute also

treats equally the affected group, those persons including minors
who have personal injury claims against health care providers.
Second, to pass equal protection review the different
treatment afforded the protected class must have a "reasonable
tendency" to further the legislative objective.

Malan v. Lewis,

693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 635 P.2d
30 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the legislative
objective behind the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in upholding
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the Act and its statute of limitations against constitutional
challenges.
It is therefore seen that the Act was premised
upon the need to protect and insure the continued
availability of health care services to the
public, and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to
shield insurance companies from legitimate claims.
The legislature exercised its discretionary prerogative in determining that the shortening of the
statute of limitations (along with requiring
notice of intention to sue), would insure the
continued availability of adequate health care
services.
635 P.2d at 32 ; 6 see Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977).
Appellants' main challenge to the Act is to simply
question the 1976 Legislature's wisdom in enacting the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act.
priate in this forum.

Appellants' argument is inappro-

Judicial review of legislation does not

include a re-evaluation of the facts the Legislature could have
considered to determine the necessity for the enactment.

The

constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause
does not depend on a court's hindsight assessment of the
empirical success or failure of the measure's provisions.

As

Justice Brennan explained in Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S. Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1981):
"whether in fact the Act will promote the [legislative

6

The Allen decision is cited by the court in Malan v. Lewis
as supporting for the second prong of the equal protection—
rational basis test. 693 P.2d at 670.
A-31
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objectives] is not the question:

the Equal Protection Clause is

satisfied by our conclusion that the [state] Legislature could
rationally have decided" that the means chosen will promote the
legislative objectives.

(Emphasis added.)

Where there was

evidence before the legislature which, if believed to be true,
supported the creation of the statutory classification, a
plaintiff cannot invalidate the statute by asking the court to
accept an argument that the legislature may have been mistaken.
Id.

The prior evidence before the Legislature cannot now be

received.
Many of the materials, reports and statistics which
were presented to the 1976 Utah Legislature prior to the
enactment of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are assuredly
no longer available.7

Even the scattered reports available, as

reported in previous decisions of the Court, however, provide
ample support for the Legislature's belief that tort reform in

1

One primary reason for not going back into the "evidence"
on which the Legislature based its judgment is the typical
unavailability of the data and discussion surrounding a
particular piece of legislation. The bulk of material that was
accumulated on the Health Care Malpractice Act was presented and
discussed in hearings before the Interim Social Services
Committee. A report of that material was apparently made
available to the Legislature. Although the hearings were
recorded, that material is routinely destroyed by the archives
department after several years. It is therefore impossible for
any party to present to the court all of the data relied upon by
the Legislature in making its informed decision.
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the medical malpractice area was needed to insure the continued
availability of quality health care, and that the shortening of
the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims would
further that objective.

In Allen this Court so concluded.

635

P.2d 31-32.
The Legislature's justification for creating a
shortened statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims
remains equally valid today.

One of the purposes of the statute

of limitations is to encourage prompt presentation of claims so
that the alleged tort feasor has a fair opportunity to defend.
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.
259 (1979).

One court explained the problems with delay:

When any alleged tort feasor is required to defend
a claim long after the alleged wrong has occurred,
the ability to successfully do so is diminished by
reason of dimmed memories, the death of witnesses,
and lost documents. As the years between injury
and suit increases so does the probability that
the search for truth at trial will be impeded and
contorted to the benefit of the plaintiff. This
harm can be exacerbated where the injured party
continues to grow, develop and change, both
physically and mentally, after the injury
complained of has occurred.
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d
585, 604 (1980).

The Utah Supreme Court has likewise

acknowledged that protection is needed against the filing of
tardy claims, and that the medical malpractice statute
limitations has the salutary effect of "adequately shielding
health care providers from claims against which it may be
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difficult to defend because of the lapse of time . . . .*

Foil

v, Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1979).
The Legislature properly recognized the need to treat
medical malpractice claims differently from other general tort
actions with respect to the operation of the statute of limitations.

Tolling a statute of limitations in a medical malpractice

case would create an insurmountable problem of trying to
determine the applicable standard of care long after the treatment and injury occur.

Advances in knowledge and technology

occur so rapidly in medicine that state-of-the-art treatment
today is likely to be considered substandard in the very near
future.

It is unreasonable to assume that a court or jury can

determine the applicable standard of care with any degree of
fairness ten or fifteen years after the fact.

It would be

impossible for jurors to fairly assess the physician's actions
based upon an ancient standard of care without taking into
account their personal knowledge of advances which have occurred
during the ensuing decades which make older techniques of
treatment seem inappropriate.
These practical problems of presenting a case more than
a decade old are compounded in this case since Jennifer is not
only a minor but a mental incompetent.

Even after Jennifer

reaches majority she will still be unable and legally incompetent
to make decisions concerning her own legal rights.
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remain unable to initiate legal proceedings in her own behalf.
If one accepts appellants' argument that the statute of
limitations should be tolled until an injured minor is competent
to bring an action on his own behalf, the statute of limitations
for a medical malpractice claim for Jennifer and others similarly
situated may never commence to run, and an action on their behalf
could be instituted decades after the cause of action arises.
The potential liability of a health care provider and the
exposure of his liability insurer in that situation becomes
indefinite; the setting of insurance rates and reserves becomes
an exercise in futility.

It was the spectre of this unjust

burden which led the Federal District Court for Utah to conclude:
[T]he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent persons from the generally tolling provisions [Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-36] is rationally related to the stated
purpose of containing the malpractice insurance
crisis. That rationality is particularly evidenced by
the facts of the present case. Serious permanent
injuries to children are often cases of large potential
damages. If the period in which such claims could be
brought were tolled until the young child reached the
age of majority, a heavy burden would be placed on
insurance carriers in evaluating and defending against
the claim, establishing appropriate reserve requirements, and setting rates. The percentage of medical
malpractice claims brought by minors is far from
insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty inherent in
tolling the period in which such claims may be brought
could drastically affect insurance rates of at least
this segment of health care providers that provide
services exclusively to minors.
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. at 158.
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The federal court further stated that the burden of
weighing the need to contain malpractice insurance costs and
thereby to ensure the availability of health care services
against the competing interests of minors and mental incompetents
whose parents or guardians fail to timely initiate an action is a
problem to be handled by the legislature, not the courts. Id.
The reasons for leaving the balancing process to the legislature
are important:
Furthermore any possible harm that may be suffered
by a minor whose parents or guardians fail to
initiate the action against a potential tortious
wrongdoer within the appropriate time period may
be outweighed by the chaos, uncertainty, and
severe prejudice which will occur to those accused
of tortious conduct, their insurance carriers, and
ultimately to the insurance carriers' rate payers
when lawsuits are permitted to be initiated
decades after the occurrence of the incident
giving rise thereto. Before such a sweeping
change is made the question of "reserve
requirements" imposed on insurance carriers and
the resulting effect on insurance rates as well as
many other issues must be addressed. The
Legislature, not the courts, is the proper forum
for the resolution of such issues.
De Santis v. Yaw, 290 Pa. Super. 535, 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (1981).
Based upon the authorities cited above, appropriate
principles of judicial review, and the legislative objectives
behind the enactment of the Act and its statute of limitations,
it is clear that § 78-14-4 complies with state as well as federal
guarantees of equal protection of laws and does not deny these
appellants access to the courts. Other jurisdictions which have
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analyzed equal protection and due process attacks by minor
plaintiffs against medical malpractice statutes of limitations
have reached similar results.

See, e.g., Donabedian v. Manzer,

153 Cal. 3d 592, 200 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1984); Kite v. Campbell, 142
Cal. 3d 793, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1983) (statute providing that
medical malpractice actions by a minor must be commenced within
three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act did not
deny a minor's right to due process under law; as a matter of
constitutional law, a statute of limitation is remedial in nature
and does not destroy fundamental rights); Wheeler v. Lenski, 8
Kan. App. 2d 408, 658 P.2d 1056 (1983) (statute which shortens
period of limitation for minors and incapacitated persons in
medical malpractice actions did not violate equal protection or
due process); Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super 261, 453 A.2d 342
(1982) (the settled rule is that it is not violative of any
constitutional rights to hold minors bound equally with adults to
the prescribed statutory periods within which legal causes of
action may be brought); Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital,
403 So.2d 158 (Ala. 1981) (statute of limitations did not violate
due process and equal protection provisions of state or federal
constitutions on ground that statute treated minors injured
through medical malpractice differently from minor victims of
other torts); Thomas v. Niemann, 397 So.2d 90 (Ala. 1981)
(minor's medical malpractice action was barred by the statute of
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limitations and was properly dismissed); Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (time
limitation affecting medical malpractice claim for death of a
minor child was not contrary to due process and equal protection) ; Rohrabauqh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980)
(court held that the legislature was not constitutionally
mandated to suspend application of statutes of limitation in
cases of infancy or incapacity and dismissed appeal which
challenged constitutionality of statute of limitations of medical
malpractice act)•

CONCLUSION
\

In light of the above, these respondents respectfully

request'the Court to affirm the lower court's determination that
the appellants' discovery of the complained of injury occurred at
least prior to NoV^mber 1977 and triggered the statute of
limitations, which nowsl^ars their complaint.

Further, the Court

should find that the actionNqf the Utah Legislature in enacting
the Utah Health Care Malpractic^N^ct and its statute of
limitations is an appropriate responke^to a legitimate and real
concern.

It is, after all, the public whlqh ultimately pays the

cost of professional liability insurance and benefits from the
continued availability of such coverage when injurifes are suffered.

In the furtherance of that objective, the legislature
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